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## Lokayata a study in ancient indian materialism pdf

Lokayata by Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya "Thought and Awareness," says Engels, "Are Human Cane Products". The truth of this, as George Thomson comments, 'is so clear that it can almost be obvious; However, the philosophers stacked the take over tomorrow in order to deny, distort or obscure. Thus, a great section of the contemporary philosophers, "claiming to be experts in the study of thought, continue their disputation without in relation to scientists have learned about the real mechanism of the human cone. In the Indian philosophy, as we have seen, Nyaya - Vaaisesikas, with his serious concern with the problems of epistemology, argued that the material body was indispensable for consciousness. However, they could not overcome the Age - ancient superstition by the soul and his release. Knowledge, feeling and will were conceived as states of an incarnate soul and liberation, the soul becomes disembreed, was devoid of consciousness. It was only a step to establish epistemology on a secure scientific basis and affirm that it was a clear absurd to speak of a soul in the body and that the conception of the liberation was in the best disappointment This step was actually taken by our Lokayatas or Carvakas, this is, the old matter Lists. Here now [Samkara said] the Lokayatikas, who only see the self in the body, are opinion that a separate auto of the body does not exist; Suppose consciousness, although it is not observed on Earth and other external elements), but combined still appear in them when transformed into the form of a body, so that the conscience molds them; And thus maintain this knowledge is the analysis of the intoxicating quality (which arises when certain materials are mixed in certain proportions), and this man is only a body qualified by the conscience. Therefore, according to them, do not separate from the body and able to go to the heavenly world or get launched, through which conscience is in the body; But the body alone is what is conscious, is the self. For this affirmation, they claim the reason, "because of his existence, where he is a body." Wherever something exists if something else exists, and there is no if this other thing does not exist, we determine the first thing to be a quality of this last; Light and heat, e.g., we determine to be fire qualities. And as life, movement, consciousness. Remembrance and so on that by the defenders of an independent self are considered qualities of this self-resulting only within agriculture and external nongers, and as an address of these different body qualities can not be proven, follows that they should be qualities of the body only; The self, therefore, is not different from the body. [2] The author of Brahma - Sutra conceived two aphorisms especially to represent and refute this philosophy. In Buddhist pitakas, we find not just the name Lokayata, but also distinct references to the view that identified the body with the self. Along with Samkhya and Yoga. Artasātra (c. B.C. Século iv) mentioned Lokayata. The Mahabharata and the first fountains of Jaina, too, mentioned this philosophy and even the upanisads were not silent about materialism, judging all these, we can easily see that materialistic tradition in India is very old as the own Indian philosophy. In these circumstances, we will not expect our ancient materialists to have a positive knowledge of the re-embrane and understood consciousness as their function. However, extremely scarce, although his scientific data were, the way they tried to explain the consciousness in terms of their own observations were actually noticeable. "Lokayatikas," said Samkara, "do not admit the existence of anything in the four elements." [3] By themselves, the elements did not possess consciousness, still aware was seen as emerging from them. Could this be possible? As well as rice, he argued the Lokayatikas, and the other ingredients of wine production did not have any intoxicating quality, but when combined in a particular way, this caused the intoxicating quality emerge, as well as the material elements that material elements, body, however. Without consciousness, it caused consciousness to emerge when combined in a particular way of forming the human body. Certainly it was one of the most significant things spoken by our ancestors to establish the primacy of the matter on the spirit. But what are the sources of our information of this materialistic philosophy? Unfortunately, only the writings of those who sought to refute and ridicule it. In other words, Lokayata, is preserved for us only in the form of Purvapakas, or represented by its opponents. Not that there would never be any real treaty of this system. Tucci, Garbe and Dasgupta cite conclusive evidence to show that Lokayata's real texts were known in ancient and first medieval times. But these texts are lost to us. As long as Sukhlaji and Parikh aroused some hopes in the last years claiming to finally discover Lokayata's real text called Tattvopaplava-Simha for a certain Jayarasi Bhatta, who, as edited by them, was published in 1940, was published in 1940. But a critical examination of the real content of the text can only cause disappointment. The title literally means, "the lion playing throughout all categories." It was so chosen because the main objective of the work was to show the impossibility of any varying knowledge (pramana) and therefore the impossibility of any vision of reality. In short, it represented the point of view of extreme skepticism according to which no category are possible epistemologic or ontologic. Of course, the vision exposed by Jayarasi was called Tattvopaplava "Vada, this is, the doctrine that threw to the sea, all the categories (Tattva). He never called for the materialistic vision for the very simple reason that it was not that, nor his vision referred to by any other text as the vision of a materialist. As we will see, the references to this vision were invariably referring to the Tattvopaplava - therefore in order to identify The true affiliation philosophical of Jayarasi, we can ask ourselves a simple question: who, in Indian philosophy, is definitely known to have confirmed such a position? As we have already seen, only extreme idealists like Sunya and Vedantins Vedantins consistently argue that all normal sources of knowledge were invalids. That is why Nagarjuna chose the pramana tortuum "vidhvamsana or the" destruction of the sources of vas " One of his works and Samkara argued that all Praman The Ā ā ē "pramana Ā ā ē" vyavahara or use relative to sources of knowledge and valid objects. Knowledge was based on ignorance or avidya. I was left for the followers of Samkara as Sriharsa and Citsukha to give a scholastic exposure of the consequences from this point of view. Sriharsa called her Khandana philosophic work, said Khandakhadya, literally, "the sweetmeat of refutations," because he wanted to establish the vede, refuting all sources of vorted knowledge and his follower Citsukha offered highly scholastic arguments in support of such a position. We have already seen why Indian idealists of the age of upanisads felt the need to deny validity are normal sources of knowledge. But how could all this have anything to do with Lokayatikas, who are we forced to accept as intransigent materialists? In fact, all the oldest and authentic Indian philosophic tradition is quite frank at this point. In other words, if Jayarasi Bhatta had any real philosophy affiliation, it was with extreme idealists; [4] And it was only Lokayatikas, that this idealistic position, along with all its superstitious concomitants, was totally totally in Indian philosophy in favor of its consistent philosophical alternative, viz. materialism. From this point of view, the writers Jaina like Vidyananda were fully justified, bracket the three philosophic positions, viz. From Sunya, Vada, Tattvopaplavaā ē "Vada and Brahma" Vada. In fact, the editors of Jayarasi work on his Ē introduĀĀ the quote a passage from Vidyananda where this was done. They also cite many other references to Jayarasi's opinions, especially the fountains of Jaina and the significant point is that in all this was referred to as Tattvopaplava and never as a materialistic doctrine. On the other hand, two positive principles were persistently attributed to Lokayatikas in the oldest and most authentic Indian philosophical literature. These were (1) the primacy of sensory perception as a source of varying knowledge and (2) the final reality being only the four known material elements. Jayarasi, by the contrary, tried to refute the two, the first explicitly and the last ones implicitly. In fact, if Jayarasi referred to any Ontolonia vision as being logically unsustainable, it was the doctrine of the four elements. As he said in the beginning of his text, even the categories like Earth, etc., which are so well - known by the people, do not support loading scrutiny. What about other categories? " How, in the face of all this, do a scholar like Sukhlaji associate his name with the thesis that Tattvopaplava-Simha was written from Lokayata's point of view? 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